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STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. EDWARD WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, District Case No. 
vs, 62999 
FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION, REGION II Supreme Case No. 
Defendant and Respondent. 14 317 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Final Order of the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County State of 
Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge. The 
order of the court denied Plaintiff's application for a 
Temporary Restraining Order until a hearing could be held 
upon Plaintiff's application for adoption of one Stephen Lacy. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hearing upon Plaintiff!s Order to Show Cause why a 
Temporary Restraining Order delaying placement of Stephen 
Lacy until hearings could be held upon Plaintiff's petition 
was held on August 12, 197 5 at which time the court took 
the matter under advisement thereafter ordering on October 
1, 1975 that Plaintiff's application for a Temporary 
Restraining Order be denied. Plaintiff filed its Notice of 
Appeal, and the case is now before this Honorable Court 
pursuant to that Notice of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks for an overruling of the lower court's 
decision and for an order reestablishing the Temporary 
Restraining Order until the question of proper placement 
be heard so that Appellant is afforded the proper due process 
of law and that she be guaranteed an opportunity for review 
by the district court of the placement decision of the Defendant. 
Appellant further seeks an equal opportunity to that of 
the undisclosed prospective parents selected by the Defendant 
for placement to have the child's welfare and best interest 
determined while in Appellant's custody so that at the time 
her petition is heard by the court she too will qualify 
under the statute as an adoptive parent. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mrs. Edward Wilson, is the 
natural grandmother of Stephen Lacy, the minor child and the 
subject of these proceedings, through his mother, Charlotte 
Lacy, who is the natural daughter of the Appellant. Charlotte 
Lacy, who was charged with child abuse and aggravated, assault 
on her son, Stephen Lacy, negotiated with the Davis County 
Attorney's Office for voluntarily deprivation of her parental 
rights to the son, Stephen Lacy, in consideration for the Davis 
County Attorney's Office dropping the charges of aggravated 
assault and child abuse against her. By order of the Juvenile 
Court of Davis County, the Defendant took custody of the said 
minor child for the purposes of adoption. 
Plaintiff applied for adoption of the said minor child 
but was denied at which time Plaintiff filed a Temporary 
Restraining Order to hold placement of the child in abeyance 
until the matter of her application for adoption could be 
reviewed by the District Court of Weber County State of Utah 
and a hearing could be held wherein Plaintiff-Appellant 
would be afforded the opportunity to put before the court 
evidences of her fitness and capacity to more adequately 
provide for the welfare of the child. (R. p. 18) Notwithstanding 
Plaintiff's Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, the agency proceeded 
to place the child out for adoption in violation of said order. 
-3-
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Thereafter on August 12, 1975 a hearing was held on 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause why the Temporary Restraining 
Order should not be continued until the matter could be 
heard on its merits. By its order of October 1, 1975 the 
Weber County District Court denied to the Appellant Plaintiff 
a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that the grandmother 
had no standing beyond that of a third party petitioner in 
the adoption. (R. p. 22) On October 22, 1975 Appellant filed her Notice 
of Appeal and the case is now before this Honorable Court 
pursuant to that Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 31) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY, DENIED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
WHEN IT FAILED TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
A HEARING, IN WHICH TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE, EXAMINE 
AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND BE REPRESENTED 
BY AN ATTORNEY. 
After voluntarily depriving herself of parental?*rights 
as the mother of Stephen Lacy in exchange for the dropping of 
the aggravated assault and child abuse charges, the Defendant 
took custody for the purposes of adoption by order of the 
Juvenile Court of Davis County. Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted 
her application for the adoption of said Stephen Lacy along with 
one other undisclosed prospective parent. On June 30th, 1975 
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the Defendant in committee decided to let the child out for 
adoption to the undisclosed prospective parents thereby 
denying to Plaintiff-Appellant her application without 
affording her a hearing and the judicial processes necessary 
to challenge the said committee's denial of her application. 
On June 30th, 1975 Plaintiff had equal rights to those 
of the selected prospective parents for placement of the 
child. She was entitled to due process of law including the 
right to present evidence, to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to be represented by an attorney. It is well 
established by the landmark decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Goldberg vs. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1968) that 
an agency can hardly be an impartial decision maker absent 
the guarantees of due process as outlined above. The United 
States Supreme Court held by that case that administrative 
agencies may not make judgments about the rights of persons 
with whom they have agency obligations without affording to 
them the essential elements of due process of law. While it 
is true that agency adoption procedures have not been a fertile 
field for litigation in this state and others, there have been 
applications made of the Goldberg case to adoption agency 
procedures. See Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 25: 650 at 
p. 683, the Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 26 Sept. 1974 p. 312, 
and C.V.C. vs. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3rd 709, 106 Cal. 
Rptr. 123 (1973). 
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In C.V.C. v. Superior Court Supraf the court held that 
the adoption agency may not terminate the placement of a 
child for adoption without due process of law wherein the 
"Cs" would be given a hearing, the right to introduce 
evidence in their behalf, examine and cross-examine witnesses, 
and be represented by an attorney. 
Two tests were applied in the C.V.C. case. First the 
existence of immediate danger to the child may compell a 
decision on the part of the adoption agency absent due process 
requirements, but so long as the status quo is not dangerous, 
due process requirements compell an evidentiary hearing. 
Supra at p. 917, 919, and 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 130. The 
second test is the determination of whether "grevious loss" 
is threatened upon the moving party. The Utah court has 
recognized a parallel between the right to adopt.a child 
and traditional property rights upon a showing that said 
prospective adoptive parents have invested love and attachment 
to the child. 
A realistic appraisal of the situation compells 
us to recognize that persons such as respondents 
who have done what they have done for this child, 
must be assumed to have affection and attachment 
for her at least equally important to property 
rights. Viewed in this light, there certainly 
have intervened "vested" rights and respondents 
have in reliance on representations made, placed 
themselves in a different position... In re 
adoption of D, 122 Utah, 525, 252 P. 2nd, 223 
(1953) at 535-36, 252 P. 2nd at 229. 
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Accordingly Plaintiff in this action, as a grandmother having 
done much for the child and invested much love "must be 
assumed to have affection and attachment for" Stephen Lacy. 
She has suffered a grevious loss of her grandchild and her 
relationship with the said child. 
Responding as timely as she did to be a candidate for 
adoption, she had equal rights to those of the selected 
family for the adoption of the minor child, Stephen Lacy. 
Having denied Plaintiff's application for adoption, the 
agency at that time should have been forced to submit to a 
hearing in which evidence could be put on and a decision 
made after the presentation of such evidence. Further an 
adverse decision against her should have been subject to a 
judicial review. See C.V.C. Supra. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE, UCA 78-30-14 (1953) (AS AMENDED), 
IS EITHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR WAS APPLIED 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
AFFORDED EQUAL PROTECTION OF HER RIGHTS AS A 
PETITIONER FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR CHILD, 
STEPHEN LACY. 
The Appellant may not file a petition for adoption in 
this matter until she shall have had custody of the child for 
at least six months prior to filing her adoption petition. 
This becomes impossible after placement of the child. In the 
-7-
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vast bulk of adoptions handled by the district courts in 
the State of Utah, the statute above functions and operates 
very smoothly, but as applied to the facts in this case, 
the said statute is either unconstitutional or was applied 
unconstitutionally in that the Plaintiff-Appellant has not 
been afforded equal protection of her rights as a contesting 
petitioner for the adoption of a minor child, Stephen Lacy, 
since the action of the Defendant effectively forecloses 
her from an equal six-month period of custody and a comparable 
study of her fitness and her environment as to whether or not 
it would provide an equal or superior setting for the welfare 
and benefit of the child. Therefore, by the language of the 
statute, the selected prospective family qualified but the 
Appellant herein does not. 
No petition for adoption shall be granted until 
the child shall have lived for six months in the 
home of the adopting parents... UCA 78-30-14(1953) 
By the agency's placement of the child with a selected 
prospective parent, there is only one set of parents which 
may qualify to present their petition for adoption after a 
six-month period. To be equally protected under the law, 
the Appellant should also be granted a six-month period 
during which she could become qualified as an adoptive parent. 
The said statute further provides that a report will be 
made by the agency to the court setting forth the qualifications 
-8-
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of the parent and specifically describing their fitness as 
parents. As a contesting prospective parent for the adoption 
of a minor child, the Appellant is left with the dramatic 
disadvantage in that all of the evidence placed before the 
court will be positive on behalf of the family under inves-
tigation. Conversely, the court and the agency will be 
deprived of any comparable investigation or study of the 
Appellant and her environment. 
Under the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 
XIV, 
No state shall...deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
In addition the Constitution of Utah in Article 1 Section 2 
provides, 
All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
(emphasis added) 
Laws which descriminate between persons of a particular 
class have been found unconstitutional under this provision. 
See Justice v. Standard Gibsonite Co., 12 Utah 2nd 357, 366 
P. 2nd 974; Weber Basin Home Builder's Assn. v. Roy City, 26 
Utah 2nd 215, 487 P. 2nd 866. 
The adoption agency and the District Court of Weber 
County State of Utah, in failing to halt the placement after 
-9-
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having received notice of a contesting claim by the Appellant, 
places the Appellant in a position of no standing to petition 
the court for adoption, and effectively deprives her of any 
adversary process for proving her superior ability and 
environment to that of the selected family. Nor can it be 
refuted that once the agency has placed the child out for 
adoption and makes a favorable report that the district 
court will feel any compulsion to open the matter up for 
consideration of Appellant's position because the district 
courts consistently agree with agency recommendations. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING TO PLAINTIFF 
A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROTECTING HER 
AGAINST THE PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD UNTIL PROPER 
HEARINGS COULD BE HELD AS TO PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY 
TO ESTABLISH A HIGHER MEASURE OF BENEFIT TO THE 
CHILD THAN THE BENEFITS THAT COULD BE PROVIDED 
BY THE PROSPECTIVE PARENTS THAT WERE SELECTED 
FOR PLACEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT. 
At some point in time along the way towards the 
adoption of Stephen Lacy, the Plaintiff or Appellant should 
have been given the opportunity for a hearing. 
In the case of C.V.C. v. Superior Court Supra, the 
Superior Court refused to stay the enforcement of an order 
terminating the placement of a child in another home whereupon 
the child was in fact placed in another home. This was held 
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to be error by the appellant court as set forth above. 
See p. 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131. Similarly, Plaintiff-
Appellant, Mrs. Edward Wilson, filed a Temporary Restraining 
Order to hold placement of the child, Stephen Lacy, in 
abeyance until the matter of Plaintiff's application for 
adoption could be reviewed by the District Court of Weber 
County State of Utah, and a hearing could be held wherein 
the Appellant would be afforded the opportunity to put 
before the court evidences of her fitness and capacity to 
more adequately provide for the welfare of the child. (R. p. 14) 
Not only did the adoption agency violate the said order by 
placing the child out for adoption notwithstanding the 
Restraining Order, but the court later dissolved the Temporary 
Restraining Order and denied to Plaintiff-Appellant an order 
on the Order to Show Cause which would effectively delay the 
placement of said child until the matter could be fully 
heard. (R. p. 22) 
Now, at this point in time, much more evidence has been 
gathered by the Defendant-Respondent to support the action 
which they have already taken so that in any hearing that 
would follow whether it were due to a contest on the petition 
of the selected adoptive parent or a contest resulting from 
a reversal by this Supreme Court followed by a hearing upon 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint on file herein, Appellant will 
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suffer a serious disadvantage with regard to her contest for 
the adoption of Stephen Lacy. The evidence gathered by the 
said Defendant-Respondent will make said hearings unfair 
and unjust as to the Appellant. The only thing that can 
offset the unfairness would be an opportunity given to the 
Appellant herein to have a comparable and equal study made 
during a six-month placement in Appellant's home. 
A showing by the Defendant-Respondent that a hearing 
before the adoption agency unduly burdens or inconveniences 
the said agency or delays the proceedings herein is without 
merit. With regard to this a few observations are necessary. 
First, administrative inconvenience must give way to individual 
interests. C.V.C., Supra at p. 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
Appellant's intervention in this case constituted a mere 
delay and if handled right would have resulted in only an 
inconvenience. Second, adoption agencies are not given carte 
blanche in their control of relinquished children but must 
be subject to scrutiny and inspection for flaws in their 
decisions. See Guardianship of Henwood, 49 Cal. 2nd 639, 644, 
320 P. 2nd 1, 3-4 (1958). The Henwood case held that there 
are other methods of caring for a child during proceedings 
other than placement when it is found that the adoption 
procedure is not running its proper course. Obviously foster 
care is one and a guardianship is another. 
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CONCLUSION 
The power of the adoption agency is absolute and not 
subject to scrutiny or inspection without a guarantee to an 
interested person or competing prospective parents to 
question and challenge their decision. At least the said 
agency is subject to due process sanctions in their decision 
to deny to one prospective parent placement of the child for 
adoption while granting said placement to another applicant 
for the said adoption. This principle is basic as a product 
of the Goldberg v. Kelly case Supra. In addition, the 
statute and the application of the said statute in this 
particular case has resulted in a situation where Plaintiff-
Appellant's petition for adoption will not even be considered 
because she will not be afforded a six-month custody or 
placement by the Defendant adoption agency. The outcome is 
an overwhelming and stark denial to the Appellant of the 
constitutional protections of the United States Constitution 
and the Utah Constitution. To prevent such an unjust result 
the Supreme Court should reverse the Weber County District 
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